Fukushima: The Story of a Nuclear Disaster Read online

  David Lochbaum is the director of the Union of Concerned Scientists’ Nuclear Safety Project and the author of Nuclear Waste Disposal Crisis.

  Edwin Lyman is a senior scientist in the Global Security Program of the Union of Concerned Scientists.

  Journalist Susan Q. Stranahan was a member of the Philadelphia Inquirer team awarded a 1980 Pulitzer Prize for its coverage of the Three Mile Island accident.

  The Union of Concerned Scientists is the leading science-based nonprofit working for a healthy environment and a safer world.

  © 2014 by Union of Concerned Scientists

  Introduction © 2015 by Union of Concerned Scientists

  All rights reserved.

  No part of this book may be reproduced, in any form, without written permission from the publisher.

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  First published in the United States by The New Press, New York, 2014

  This paperback edition published by The New Press, 2015

  Distributed by Perseus Distribution

  ISBN 978-1-62097-118-5 (e-book)

  LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA

  Lochbaum, David A.

  Fukushima : the story of a nuclear disaster / David Lochbaum, Edwin Lyman, Susan Q. Stranahan, and the Union of Concerned Scientists.

  p.cm.

  Includes bibliographical references and index.

  1. Fukushima Nuclear Disaster, Japan, 2011. 2. Nuclear power plants—Accidents—Japan— Fukushima-ken. I. Union of Concerned Scientists. II. Title.

  TK1365.J3L63 2014

  363.17'990952117—dc23

  2013035284

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  CONTENTS

  Introduction to the Paperback Edition

  1.March 11, 2011: “A Situation That We Had Never Imagined”

  2.March 12, 2011: “This May Get Really Ugly . . .”

  3.March 12 Through 14, 2011: “What the Hell Is Going On?”

  4.March 15 Through 18, 2011: “It’s Going to Get Worse . . .”

  5.Interlude—Searching for Answers: “People . . . Are Reaching the Limit of Anxiety and Anger”

  6.March 19 Through 20, 2011: “Give Me the Worst Case”

  7.Another March, Another Nation, Another Meltdown

  8.March 21 Through December 2011: “The Safety Measures . . . Are Inadequate”

  9.Unreasonable Assurances

  10.“This Is a Closed Meeting. Right?”

  11.2012: “The Government Owes the Public a Clear and Convincing Answer”

  12.A Rapidly Closing Window of Opportunity

  Appendix: The Fukushima Postmortem: What Happened?

  Glossary

  Key Individuals

  U.S. Boiling Water Reactors with “Mark I” and “Mark II” Containments

  Notes and References

  Index

  INTRODUCTION TO THE PAPERBACK EDITION

  Nearly four years have passed since the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant in Japan. Since that time, the long-term environmental and economic consequences of the accident and the magnitude of the effort it will take to address them have come into sharper focus. While Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) has almost completed removal of the spent fuel assemblies from their precarious perch in Unit 4, the inability to contain the vast and growing quantity of contaminated water at the plant site has emerged as one of the biggest problems that Japan is facing. Water being pumped into the reactors to cool the damaged cores continues to leak out through cracks in the containment structures while hundreds of gallons of groundwater flow under the site every day, washing radioactive contamination into the sea. TEPCO does not have the capacity to collect and treat all of this water. It is constructing a system to freeze a mile-long wall of soil around the contaminated area in order to divert groundwater flow, but that may not work. Preliminary attempts to freeze a much smaller area have failed.

  Although more details about the accident and its aftermath have come to light, the fundamental elements of this disaster remain the same: a trio of reactor cores in meltdown; an extended loss of all power; vulnerable pools of deadly spent fuel at risk of boiling dry; radiation threatening large swaths of Japan, including Tokyo, the world’s most populous metropolis, and potentially even parts of the United States. Images of reactor buildings exploding, stories of heroic efforts to save the plant, poignant accounts of families uprooted from their homes and heritage, and communities rendered uninhabitable will remain vivid in the public consciousness for years to come.

  The story of Fukushima Daiichi is a larger tale, however. It is the saga of a technology promoted through the careful nurturing of a myth: the myth of safety. Nuclear power is an energy choice that gambles with disaster.

  Fukushima Daiichi unmasked the weaknesses of nuclear power plant design and the long-standing flaws in operations and regulatory oversight. Although Japan must share the blame, this was not a Japanese nuclear accident; it was a nuclear accident that just happened to have occurred in Japan. The problems that led to the disaster at Fukushima Daiichi exist wherever reactors operate.

  The staff of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) appear to have finally accepted this as well, concluding in a November 2013 report that even if Japan had the same regulatory framework as the United States prior to the accident, there is no assurance “that the Fukushima accident and associated consequences could or would have been completely avoided.”

  Although the accident involved a failure of technology, even more worrisome was the role of the worldwide nuclear establishment: the close-knit culture that has championed nuclear energy—politically, economically, socially—while refusing to acknowledge and reduce the risks that accompany its operation. Time and again, warning signs were ignored and near misses with calamity written off.

  Important lessons from Fukushima Daiichi continue to emerge. TEPCO now believes that core damage at Unit 3 was more extensive than it had previously estimated because the emergency core cooling system in the Unit 3 reactor stopped working earlier than it had thought. Consequently, the core became uncovered around 2:30 a.m. on March 13, rather than 9:00 a.m., as we reported in the book. And TEPCO is now convinced that a containment failure at Unit 2 on March 15, coupled with an unfavorable weather pattern, was the cause of the extensive radiation contamination to the northwest of the site. However, much still remains unknown about what happened inside the Japanese nuclear plant.

  Also unclear is the magnitude of the long-term effects of radiation releases on human health and the environment, as well as the ultimate economic impact. Based on a 2014 estimate of the total radiation dose to the Japanese public for eighty years after the accident by the UN Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, a few thousand cancer deaths could be expected. However, the ultimate human toll depends on the fate of the more than one hundred thousand evacuees who remain displaced because their homes are cont
aminated. The Japanese authorities could limit future radiation exposures by enforcing strict cleanup standards before allowing the evacuees to return to their homes, but instead they are declaring areas safe where radiation levels are ten times greater than normal background levels.

  One thing is certain: absent the valiant and tireless efforts of many at Fukushima Daiichi, the consequences could have been much, much worse.

  Fukushima Daiichi provided the world with a sobering look at a nuclear accident playing out in real time. Like previous accidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, the events that began on March 11, 2011, defied the computer simulations and glib assurances of nuclear power promoters that this form of energy is a prudent and low-risk investment. It cannot hope to fulfill that claim absent an unwavering and uncompromising commitment to safety.

  Excuses about this accident flew almost from the outset. Nobody had predicted an earthquake this large. Nobody had expected a huge tsunami to flood a low-lying coastal nuclear plant. Nobody had envisioned an accident involving multiple reactors. Nobody had assumed such an event could involve a loss of power for more than a few hours. But all of this did happen, and within a matter of hours the assurances of nuclear safety were revealed as a fallacy.

  Even so, many in the United States, Japan, and elsewhere are pushing hard to defend the status quo and hold fast to the assertion that severe accidents are so unlikely that they require scant advance planning. Those who might differ with that view—among them the tens of thousands of Japanese whose lives have been radically altered—have thus far largely been shut out of the public policy debate over nuclear power.

  In Japan, the conservative government under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe continues its push to restart Japan’s nuclear plants as rapidly as possible. The Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA), which was created in the wake of the accident to bolster the credibility of the Japanese nuclear regulatory system, has begun the process with its approval of the restart of the Sendai plant on the southern island of Kyushu, despite its location thirty miles away from an active volcano. Questions linger about the independence of the NRA, as Abe replaces its initial members with pronuclear individuals with close industry ties. The government simply seems in denial about the very real potential for another catastrophic accident.

  In the United States, the NRC has also continued operating in denial mode. It turned down a petition requesting that it expand emergency evacuation planning to twenty-five miles from nuclear reactors despite the evidence at Fukushima that dangerous levels of radiation can extend at least that far if a meltdown occurs. It decided to do nothing about the risk of fire at over-stuffed spent fuel pools. And it rejected the main recommendation of its own Near-Term Task Force to revise its regulatory framework. The NRC and the industry instead are relying on the flawed FLEX program as a panacea for any and all safety vulnerabilities that go beyond the “design basis.” This should provide little comfort to the public living near the dozens of nuclear plants around the United States that are susceptible to earthquakes and floods far larger than they were originally designed to withstand.

  Other methods of generating energy also carry risks in terms of environmental costs as well as human health and safety impacts. But that is no excuse for continuing to hold nuclear power only to the inadequate safety standards that made the Fukushima disaster possible. Nuclear energy is an unforgiving technology, and the consequences of a mistake can be catastrophic.

  This book is a collaboration. It weaves a detailed explanation of what went wrong inside the crippled nuclear plant together with a narrative of events taking place in the halls of government in Tokyo and the emergency operations center of the NRC. It reveals how those responsible for protecting the public in the United States and Japan were caught unprepared and often helpless.

  Of equal importance, the book describes the nuclear establishment’s multi decade effort to weaken safety rules and regulatory oversight, especially in the United States. In doing so, this book answers the question heard so often in this country in the aftermath of March 11, 2011: can it happen here? The answer is an unequivocal yes.

  Fukushima: The Story of a Nuclear Disaster also addresses another critical question: how can we work toward ensuring that it never does?

  The minute-by-minute account of events at Fukushima Daiichi, as revealed by conversations among the nuclear experts, gives the average reader a rare glimpse into just how complex a nuclear accident can be—and how ill-equipped regulators and the industry are to deal with one, no matter where it takes place. Absent significant upgrades in nuclear operation and regulation, it will be only a matter of time until the world watches as another Fukushima unfolds.

  Profound thanks go to Mary Lowe Kennedy, whose skills as an editor run very deep. She jumped into a book about nuclear safety with enthusiasm, with a dedication that never flagged, and with the shared goal of making this a story understandable to all who remember Fukushima and want to learn more.

  Special thanks also go to three members of the Union of Concerned Scientists’ staff: Stephen Young for taking the initiative to launch the project and Lisbeth Gronlund and David Wright for their counsel and commentary. Peter Bradford generously provided his insights, as did Charles Casto, whose firsthand knowledge of the accident added a valuable dimension to the book. Yuri Kageyama of the Tokyo bureau of the Associated Press generously volunteered her time, helping with translation and research.

  Thanks also to Katja Hering for her support and assistance with obtaining documents, and to Rhoda and Andrea Lyman for their support for this project.

  Edwin Lyman and Susan Q. Stranahan

  October 2014

  1

  MARCH 11, 2011: “A SITUATION THAT WE HAD NEVER IMAGINED”

  At 2:49 p.m., the chandeliers began to sway in an ornate hearing room of the Diet Building, home to Japan’s parliament. Prime Minister Naoto Kan glanced nervously toward the high ceiling. Legislators darted about, their voices rising as the shaking increased. One speaker advised everyone to duck under the desks. Aides hurried to the prime minister’s side, uncertain where safety actually lay.

  NHK, Japan’s public broadcasting system, was televising the Kan hearing. As an unsteady camera captured the confusion in the hearing room, the network was receiving an earthquake alert from the Japan Meteorological Agency. Ground-motion sensors along the coast near Sendai, north of Tokyo, had picked up seismic activity offshore. Based on those readings, the agency estimated that a magnitude 7.9 quake was likely. In thirty seconds it dispatched a warning to residents along the northeastern coast. Personal cell phones lit up. Businesses, schools, hospitals, and the news media all received alerts; twenty-four bullet trains operating in the region glided to a halt.

  Within ninety seconds, NHK had interrupted its coverage to provide early details about the quake. Almost instantly, TV screens across Japan began displaying emergency information.

  In Sendai, an NHK cameraman hopped aboard the helicopter kept on permanent standby for the network and lifted off from the airport. It would be perhaps the last aircraft to depart the facility before the earthquake crisis took a dramatic turn for the worse. The footage shot from that helicopter would soon be replayed again and again around the world.

  Japan sits atop one of the most earthquake-prone regions of the world, shaken by more than a thousand tremors each year. The ancient Japanese believed a giant catfish lay buried beneath the islands. When the creature thrashed about, the earth moved. Modern scientists have their own explanation: several massive plates of the earth’s crust abut each other around the islands of Japan, shifting continuously a few inches per year. If their movement is impeded, stress builds until it is released in a seismic event. That event may be barely detectable—or it can be catastrophic.

  Along the northeastern coast, the westward-moving Pacific Plate is forced beneath the North American Plate that holds most of northern Japan. This downward movement along a seam in the earth’s surface is known as subduction. It is respo
nsible for producing some of the world’s largest earthquakes.

  A map of Japan showing the major cities. Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, University of Texas

  Although northeastern Japan is no stranger to earthquakes, seismologists long believed that a subduction quake was unlikely to happen there because the 140-million-year-old Pacific Plate was sliding downward smoothly, never creating a huge buildup of stress. Unbeknownst to them, however, sections of the two plates had locked together, possibly for as long as a thousand years, while pressure continued to build.

  At 2:46 p.m. on March 11, 2011, about eighty miles offshore, the strain along the tightly squeezed plate surfaces finally became too great. Like a stubborn load winched too tightly, the Pacific Plate broke free and lurched downward with a jerk. That freed the North American Plate to spring upward, the pressure relieved. Along a seam of more than 180 miles, the Pacific Plate dropped at an angle, moving 100 to 130 feet westward as the overlying North American Plate rose up and angled eastward the same distance.

  Within moments, the northern half of the island of Honshu, Japan’s largest, was stretched more than three feet to the east, a movement of land mass so great the earth’s axis shifted by several inches.

  Earthquakes send out packets of energy in a successive series of waves. First come the body waves, which travel through the entire body of the earth. The fastest body waves are primary (P) waves, which are nondestructive and travel three or four miles per second. This is the ground motion Japan’s earthquake early-warning sensors detect. P waves are followed by secondary (S) waves, which travel at about half the speed but have the potential to cause more damage. Following the P and S body waves are the even slower surface waves, which cause the most severe ground motion and are responsible for the most damage to surface structures. The lead time provided by P waves is crucial because even a few minutes’ advance notice allows people to seek safety and critical systems to shut down.